There are only three mentions of “great power” in the Trump administration’s newly released National Security Strategy (NSS)—and one advises, in effect, not to worry much about great powers, since “vast oceans” separate the United States from them. It’s a sea change from the first Trump administration’s 2017 NSS, which did so much to put the concept of great-power competition with China and other adversarial powers at the center of US foreign policy across parties.
I asked Matt Kroenig, head of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and host of ACTV’s “So What’s the Strategy?” show, what he made of all this. He responded:
“In recent years, we have seen that China is increasingly working with Russia, North Korea, and Iran to form a new Axis of Aggressors. How to simultaneously deter and, if necessary, defeat this Axis may be the biggest national security threat the United States has ever faced. So it is surprising that this issue receives little attention in the new national security strategy.
“The competition with China is implied throughout the document but never foregrounded. For example, the section on the Indo-Pacific states, ‘A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition.’ This section also calls for ‘winning the economic and technological competition.’ Presumably these competitions are with China. There is a strong focus on nuclear deterrence and missile defense. Who are these strategic weapons meant to deter? The section on the Western Hemisphere promises to counter ‘hostile foreign [read Chinese] incursion or ownership of key assets.’
“Executing this strategy, therefore, will result in the continuation of competition with China. But why the reluctance to call out the China threat directly? The absence of a typical ‘strategic context’ section at the front of the document, clearly outlining the threats and opportunities facing the United States, may be part of the explanation. Others have speculated that anti-China language was watered down to avoid upsetting ongoing trade negotiations with Beijing. That is as plausible an explanation as any.”
Jason Marczak, head of the Atlantic Council’s Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center, reflected on what is foregrounded instead:
“The new NSS is clear: The Western Hemisphere is now the United States’ top priority. This is a welcome shift for those who have long raised the concern that US interests should begin close to home.
“The strategy gives insight into the Trump administration’s ultimate goal in Venezuela. A country where [Nicolás] Maduro and his cronies currently provide safe haven for criminal groups, profit from trafficking, and welcome the influence of foreign adversaries is a direct threat to US national security. Success in Venezuela, therefore, means ushering in a democratic government that’s a genuine US partner as part of the [administration’s] goal to “expand” US partnerships. And a US shift to the Western Hemisphere as part of the ‘Trump Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine also signals that the redeployment of US forces to the Caribbean is not time-bound.”
Your AC Intel starts there—with more from Jason, Matt, and other Atlantic Council experts on all aspects of the new NSS.
